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ABSTRACT 
THREE THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARISON OF DEWEY 
KOHLBERG, AND NODDINGS' MODELS OF MORAL GROWTH 
May 1998 
Mark J. Connerty, B.A., University of Massachusetts Amherst 
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
Directed by Associate Professor Delores Gallo 
' 
This paper will compare the moral theories developed by John Dewey, Lawrence 
Kohlberg, and Nel Noddings to discern places of agreement and areas of dispute. The 
paper will also examine the most consequential ethical formulations of the three thinkers. 
For Dewey it is his conception of conscientiousness. For Kohlberg it is the idea of 
justice. Lastly, for Noddings it is the virtue of empathy found in the caring response. 
These conceptions are the foundations of their moral ideas. They color their thoughts on 
such related topics as the objective versus subjective nature of morality, the role of the 
rational and the emotional faculties in decision making, and the elements of moral 
judgment. This paper will examine where Dewey, Kohlberg, and Noddings stand on 
these issues and how they compare and contrast with each other. Their theories present 
an insightful glimpse into the entirety and diversity of the moral nature that informs the 
human condition. For this the moral theories of Dewey, Kohlberg, and Noddings merit a 
studied inquiry which this paper seeks to accomplish. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will examine three leading moral theorists of this century, John 
Dewey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Nel Noddings. John Dewey, variously described a 
pragmatist of positivist, left a deep and diverse body of writings that continues to 
influence the landscape of American psychology and philosophy today. His ethical 
theories relate to his studies of progressive education and the functioning of the mind. He 
originated the stage theory of moral growth that has shaped the thinking of moral 
philosophers such as Piaget, Kohlberg, and others. Dewey' s highest formulation of 
morality is an ethic directed toward goodness through consciousness. 
Lawrence Kohl berg is a moral theorist known for his formulation of the six stages 
of moral development. This model and its characteristics are influenced by the Western 
philosophical tradition, particularly the Socratic and Kantian traditions. Kohlberg is 
further indebted to Dewey's moral writings, including the role of obligation and action, 
his stress on scientific inquiry, and his theory of stage growth. Kohlberg' s work is driven 
by his conception of justice as the most sublime ideal of ethical goodness. 
Nel Noddings is an educational specialist whose book Caring continues the focus 
on empathy that Carol Gilligan brought to her studies of the moral behavior of women. 
Noddings further develops this line of thinking with her formulation of the ethic of 
caring. This ethic is based on the affective nature of humans and stands at times in 
marked contrast to the theories of Dewey and Kohl berg. Noddings' moral philosophy 
finds its highest ideal in her conception of empathy and kindness. 
CHAPTER 1 
DEWEY'S DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The heart of Dewey' s ethical philosophy is summarized by his statement that "the 
moral world is here and now; it is a reality apart from the wishes, or failure to wish, of 
any given individual." (Dewey, 1969, 167) Dewey has staked out a definitive position in 
this pronouncement, placing the moral world in the context of the living present and 
testifying to the distinct, objective nature of morality. It is a reality greater than any one 
of us because it concerns all of us, yet it can only be fully realized through the medium of 
the thinking, the acting subjective being. 
The manner by which the individual realizes his place in the moral world is the 
process of reasoned reflection and corresponding action. This belief in the deliberative 
act is the cornerstone of Dewey's formulation of moral conduct. In his A Theory of 
Ethics Dewey states that a moral law is "the principle of action." (Dewey, 1969, 1 77) It is 
not a remote abstraction but an organic, ever-changing series of relationships we come to 
know through experiences with the social world. Action implies an audience to be acted 
upon. This, for Dewey, is the immediate social order. Morality gathers its material from 
the public realm of the society and works upon it in the private realm of the individual. 
Here Dewey is following in the footsteps of the 19th century rationalists, 
particularly Kant, who wedded reason and action in his conception of Duty. Dewey 
agrees that the road to moral truth lies in the reflective function finding fulfillment in the 
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active life, and like Kant, Dewey thinks the origin of this process is empirical experience. 
The evolution of this idea can be traced back to the French and English Enlightenment of 
the 18th century when the scientific revolution hailed the emergence of a new approach 
to knowledge based on observable fact. The method that Bacon, Hume and their peers 
proposed for the physical world, Kant and his circle urged for the moral world a century 
later. Dewey continues in this tradition. "Since morals is concerned with conduct, it 
grows out of special empirical facts." (Boydston 1983, 204) 
Dewey further asserts that morality, far from Christianity's view of a far-off, fixed 
place of judgment is: 
The most human of all subjects. It 
is that which is closest to human nature; 
it is ineradicably empirical, not theological 
nor metaphysical nor mathematical. Since 
it directly concerns human nature, everything 
that can be known of the human mind and 
body in physiology, medicine, anthropology, 
and psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry ... 
moral science is not something with a separate 
province. It is physical, biological and historical 
knowledge placed in human context where it 
will illuminate and guide the activities of men. 
(Dewey 1969, 204-205) 
Dewey's synthesis of empirical process with ethical content grounds the moral world in 
the present and the human. Dewey believes that all other influential moral theories, with 
the exception of utilitarianism, refuse to accommodate this application of the empirical. 
He offers the example of Christians following the given commands of the distant and 
supernatural, The Romantics and Transcendentalists believing in the immanent but 
unseen spirit, and the Greek Stoics confusing the natural laws with moral laws. For 
Dewey, only the marriage of sense, reason, and conduct will provide us with the 
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knowledge of how to be moral in the present, and in every moment of our lives. Only the 
tool of the scientific method put to the service of morality will lead to genuine moral 
goodness. 
It is also from the "Age of Reason" that Dewey finds a complimentary theme to 
the scientific method. From the enlightenment ideal of the autonomy and dignity of the 
individual Dewey formulates his conception of freedom. Dewey calls freedom "the most 
practical of all moral questions . . . " (Dewey 1969, 8) Without freedom man cannot be 
moral because he lacks the choice between doing a better or worse thing. Freedom is the 
basis of moral responsibility. Dewey proposes that there is no responsibility for any 
result not intended or foreseen. Such results are merely physical, not moral. But when a 
result is foreseen, it is no longer an outcome of external forces but the individual's 
"conception of an end." Dewey states that "we are responsible for our conduct because 
that conduct is ourselves objectified into action." (Dewey 1969, 161) It is free will that 
makes this chosen conduct possible and which makes us responsible for it. 
Dewey identifies two forms of freedom. Negative freedom is the ability to 
control the appetites and desires so that a moral end can be achieved. Dewey calls this 
ability to control the appetites by reasoned reflection the power of self government. The 
other freedom Dewey calls potential freedom. Potential freedom consists of the process 
of placing various outcomes before the rational eye. The ability to conceive of various 
ends establishes a freedom of choice, or potential to act in different ways. This freedom 
to choose potential outcomes is not only the central feature of the idea of free will, but is 
also the spark for moral reflection and action. 
Free will, the freedom to act, originates in the idea of free reason. For Dewey the 
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highest faculty of man, the one that speaks to the whole of the human condition, is 
reason. It bears upon every aspect of his understanding and character. Reason, the 
ability to process sensory data into analysis of condition, relation, and outcome, is also 
the most appropriate tool for determining moral action. The ability to reason freely is the 
heart of morality for it is the ability to contemplate the various outcomes of a situation 
and to choose which one is the more ethically appropriate. Without reason there is no 
choice and without choice no free will to act. Thus morality hinges upon the rational 
nature of man. 
Reason, which finds its material in the observable facts of experience, gives rise 
to judgments upon both the nature of those facts and how best to respond to them. The 
method of judgment according to Dewey, like that of reason should be an "impersonal, 
impartial habit of observation", a "habit of scrutinizing conduct objectively" (Dewey 
1969, 220) that is akin to the process utilized in scientific inquiry. Judging, for Dewey, is 
indeed a habit for it is a continuous process of decision making. 
Of all the habits which constitute the 
character of an individual, the habit 
of judging moral situations is the most 
important, for this is the key to the 
direction and to the remaking of all 
other habits . . . the moral life has its center 
in the periods of suspended and 
postponed action, when the energy of 
the individual is spent in recollection 
and foresight, in severe inquiry and 
serious consideration of alternative aims. 
((Boydston 1978, 375) 
Judgment is the conduit between thought and action, reason and relation. It is perfected 
judgment awakened by elevated reflection that gives rise to just action. The reformation 
of moral judgment leads to the reformation of the man. This refinement of judgment 
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leads also to the fulfillment of the will in the form of action. 
The instrument by which the wish of judgment is implemented in the physical 
world is the will . The will brings theoretical decisions into the world of practical 
experience and interactive relations. The will, then, carries the commands of the 
individual mind into the active and social world. Dewey, in fact, equates the relation of 
knowledge and action to the individual and the social. But what for Dewey constitutes 
action? Dewey makes a distinction between the various forms of common action and 
genuine action. Common action includes the dictates of external authority which 
demands conformity; customary action, based upon precedence; routine action; self-
interested actions, etc. In all of these cases there exists a gap between thought and 
conduct, theory and practice. This divorce between knowledge and experience leads to 
impractical idealism on the one hand and uninspired materialism on the other. Genuine 
action consists of a knowledge-based intelligence directing a measured action. This 
reasoned conduct leads not only to authentic action, but in the context of individual-social 
relations to true morality. 
Action is the fulfillment of individual thought in the social realm. Dewey further 
states that individual thought, to be moral, must also find fulfillment in this realm. 
"Selfhood is not something which exists apart from association and intercourse. The 
relationships which are produced by the fact that interests are formed in this social 
environment are far more important than are the adjustments of isolated selves." 
(Boydston 1985, 298-299) Dewey contends that morality potentially concerns every act 
of our lives so that its influence is felt in all spheres including the social. "Morals is as 
much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment as walking is an 
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interaction of legs with a physical environment." (Boydston 1983, 219) In fact, Dewey 
makes interaction of the self with the society the overriding condition of morality. 
Morals are realized in social relations, the most embedded of which become 
institutions. True morality is the surrender of private interests to the welfare of the 
whole. "The smaller local life of the private self is given up in order that the richer and 
fuller life of the social or active self may be realized." (Dewey 1969, 222) Dewey thinks 
there is no such thing as private morality. Morality is a common and public property that 
the individual works upon to perfect for the good of all. The individual cannot become 
moral in a vacuum, he must interact with the society and within the ethical system that 
society represents. Dewey sums up this view in his A Theory of Ethics: "These 
institutions are morality real and objective; the individual becomes moral as he shares in 
this moral world, and takes his due place in it." (Dewey 1969, 170) 
Dewey has argued that it is a man's active, social relationships that condition his 
moral development. Man, for Dewey, cannot become a moral creature in absentia of 
others. Institutions and their laws, the moral codes embraced by a society, in particular 
regulate this growth. In his section of Ethics entitled the "Moral Life of the Individual" 
Dewey considers how these agencies awaken this moral consciousness. He believes this 
moral consciousness to be based of active relations not the consciousness of theoretical 
relations that exist in contemplation. This moral consciousness represents Dewey' s 
highest formulation of the moral development of the individual. 
The practical beginnings of this consciousness is conscience. Dewey asserts that 
conscience is the recognition of the means to the ends of an action and that it is made up 
of three elements. 1. The knowledge of forms of conduct; 2. The recognition of the 
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obligatoriness of these forms; 3. The emotions which color this recognition. Conscience, 
for Dewey, is not a distinct subset of the mind but is the normal intelligence working 
upon moral material. "Intelligence deals with the relations of persons and deeds, and it is 
termed conscience." (Dewey 1969, 184) 
Dewey, like Kohlberg, perceived an organized stage structure of moral growth. 
Unlike Kohlberg who broke these stages down into six headings, Dewey finds three 
groupings. They are the conventional conscience, the loyal conscience, and the reflective 
conscience. The moulding influence of the social institutions without the aid of 
independent reflection creates the mindset of the conventional conscience. This form of 
morality becomes consolidated into laws, obeyable commands and maxims. The person 
is shaped and guided solely by external forces. 
The second-level conscience, the loyal conscience, begins the process of 
verification of the world's imprint. Not yet critical of social institutions, the individual 
recognizes the practical importance of these agencies in the continuance of his lifestyle. 
He actively identifies with these value-forms and they seem to be an extension of his own 
free will. He recognizes the inherent freedom of social conviction. The highest or 
reflective stage of development concerns the active questioning of the previously 
accepted value-systems. It seeks to criticize in order to correct, to perfect first the 
individual's own ethical code and then the mores of the existing social structure. Dewey 
identifies this process with the work of the great moral teachers of history. But Dewey is 
also satisfied that most people should fashion these types of relations within their smaller 
social circles. For him, only constant reflection of the conscience in this second and 
smaller arena may lead to the possibility of the first and larger arena. 
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Dewey thinks that an error is committed when it is asserted that the content as 
well as the form of this conscience is subjective. Dewey maintains that the social 
standard upon which the individual conscience reflects is universal and objective. It is 
embodied in social relationships and practiced in regard to "historical forms and 
contemporary ideals." (Dewey 1969, 189) Yet Dewey believes that value-systems can 
and should always be perfected, but only in the context of what is already in existence. 
He says: "A morality which does not recognize both the possibility and the necessity of 
advance is immorality." (Dewey 1969, 189) But this conscience must be based on the 
moral consciousness expressed in "existing institutions, manners, and beliefs." (Dewey 
1969, 189) Otherwise it becomes relativistic. 
Reflective intelligence cross-questions 
the existing morality; and extracts from 
it the ideal which it pretends to embody, 
and thus is able to criticize the existing 
morality in the light of its own ideal. It 
points out the inconsistencies, the 
incoherencies, the compromises, the 
failures, between the actual practice and 
the theory at the basis of this practice. 
And thus the new ideal proposed by the 
individual is not a product of his private 
opinions, but is the outcome of the ideal 
embodied in existing customs, ideas and 
institutions. (Dewey 1969, 190) 
Dewey is proposing a synthesis of individual reflective conscience and public moral 
consciousness that will result in a perfecting of the moral development of both the 
individual and the society of which he is a member. 
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CHAPTER2 
JUSTICE AND STAGE DEVELOPMENT 
Lawrence Kohlberg' s primary contribution to moral education is his formulation 
of the six stages of moral development. He groups the stages into three levels: the 
preconventional, the conventional, and the postconventional or autonomous level. The 
stages ascend from an obedience orientation to an objective principle of justice. 
Kohlberg rejects what he calls the "bag of virtues" approach to moral education. The bag 
of virtues is a set of character traits considered by many to be desirable . Some examples 
of these would be honesty, charity, loyalty and courage. Kohlberg objects to this idea on 
the grounds that everyone has their own bag, and that the definitions of the individual 
traits differ from person to person. The defect Kohlberg concludes is that this approach 
to moralization, like many others, is based upon a relativist view. What is needed is an 
objective philosophy of ethical conduct applicable and practicable by all peoples of the 
world. Kohlberg responded by developing his stage approach and naming as its highest 
common good the ideal of justice. 
The ideal of justice is of course as old as the Greek and Jewish traditions of 
Western Culture and perhaps far older. Justice as an element of the Good gained 
considerable momentum during the Socratic and Platonic Eras of the Athenian Age. The 
two philosophers proposed that virtue is objective, that it is of one substance and that it 
has the same ideal form regardless of culture or period. The name of the ideal form is 
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justice. According to Plato, he who knows the Good (i.e. justice) chooses the good and 
this good can in fact be taught. It can be taught because the good is of a nature inherent 
and apparent to all ofus if uncovered. Finally, the proper method of this uncovering is 
the asking of questions, not the giving of answers. Kohlberg agrees with much of the 
Socratic and Platonic vision of the Good as justice, and they are the most significant 
influence on his work. Where he disagrees, such as his notion of equality rather than 
hierarchy as the central concern of justice, he does so within the framework of their 
models. 
Kohlberg incorporates other influences, including the rationalist's ideal ofreason, 
the humanists focus on the here and now, and in particular, Kant's conception of justice 
as duty. But perhaps his most singular influence of the modern age is John Dewey. Both 
Kohlberg and Dewey reject traditional standards and value relativism, including the 
cultural transmission, romantic and behaviorist approaches, for ethical universals such as 
the Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule. Both believe in a process of ascension 
to higher levels of moral functioning with Kohlberg setting forth a more rigidly-defined 
model of stage sequencing. There are many more similarities and a few important 
differences among the works of Kohlberg and Dewey. It is not necessary to enumerate 
them here as the focus of this chapter is Kohlberg's own formulation of the moral 
development of the individual. Dewey's influence may well be apparent in this brief 
summary. However, the primary comparative issues will be more fully addressed in the 
concluding chapter of this paper. 
This paper has asserted that Kohlberg's ethical philosophy has been inspired by 
several sources including Platonic Idealism, Kantian Rationalism, and Dewey' s brand of 
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Pragmatic Progressivism. From Plato, Kohlberg has taken the notion of an objective 
form of virtue known as justice; from Kant the idea of universal, rational and process-
oriented principles of ethics; and from Dewey, Kohlberg has derived his model of the 
ordered stages of moral growth. It is this model that is the central concept and foremost 
contribution of Kohlberg's theory of ethics. 
Kohl berg devised a set of general stages of moral thought "that can be defined 
independently of the specific content of particular moral decisions or actions." (Kohl berg 
1981, 16) Kohlberg's typology contains three different levels of thinking, with each level 
comprising two related stages. The first level, the pre-conventional, typifies thinking that 
is concerned with rewards, bartering, and fear and threat of punishment. The second, or 
conventional level, has to do with maintaining and conforming to the rules and laws of 
the person's family, group or nation. The last level is called the postconventional level, 
and is identified with universal moral principles of justice and freedom. 
Kohl berg arrived at this theory through the kind of empirical study championed 
by Dewey. Kohlberg designed a series of cross-cultural, age specific tests aimed at 
testing the veracity of his claims. Using hypothetical moral situations such as the Heinze 
Dilemma, Kohlberg interviewed children and adults in the Yucatan, the United States, 
England, Turkey and other regions to delineate the forms of moral thought. This research 
confirmed Kohl berg's formulation of the moral stages, the principle-content of each stage 
and the manner by which the individual progresses through them. This method of 
progression is disequilibrium. Tension aroused by the discrepancy between the moral 
compass of the person and the events he is confronted with leads to a sense of 
disequilibrium and a glimpse at a higher stage of morality that is more adequate to 
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addressing the ethical situation posed. The person chooses the higher form of moral 
conduct to reestablish his equilibrium. 
Kohlberg further defined the stages based on given motives for obeying rules of 
moral action: 
1. Obeys rules to avoid punishment. 
2. Conforms to obtain rewards, have favors returned. 
3. Conforms to avoid disapproval and dislike by others. 
4. Conforms to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt. 
5. Conforms to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of 
community welfare. 
6. Conforms to avoid self-condemnation. (Kohlberg 1981 , 19) 
As is evident these stages are process-oriented and as such are not guided by content-
specific virtues such as integrity and kindness which are the hallmark of the various 
value-relativist schools of thought. They appeal to an ideal of morality rooted in 
objective principles, not specific characteristics or commands. An example of this is the 
Categorical Imperative which states: Act only as you would be willing that your act 
should become universal law. (Kohlberg 1981 , 19) This is, according to Kohlberg, "A 
guide for choosing among behaviors, not a prescription for behavior. As such, it is free 
from culturally defined content; it both transcends and subsumes particular social laws. 
Hence it has universal applicability." (Kohlberg 1981 , 69) 
The universal nature ofKohlberg' s moral theory rests upon the idea of the 
potentiality of the stages, the fact that we all have it within ourselves to reach the highest 
stages of moral growth. This ability to become more fully moral, this power of 
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awakening, Kohl berg calls the "Socratic faith in the power of the rational good." 
(Kohlberg 1981, 29) Another key component of stage ascension is the idea of 
socialization. The individual uncovers the moral stages through his interactions with his 
society. Thus justice as the highest moral virtue is realizable only in the social milieu. 
And justice is implemented in the milieu through just acts. Morality is as much for 
Kohlberg as Dewey a morality of the practical, an ethics of action. For both men, to be 
just is to do. 
If the process of moral development for Kohlberg is social action, the form it 
takes is justice. "Justice, in tum, is a matter of equal and universal human rights." 
(Kohlberg 1981, 39) Justice, Kohlberg declares, is not a rule but an ethical principle. 
The difference is that a principle is universal, applicable to all nations and men. 
Kohl berg is proposing here that concepts of the good are culturally universal. So while 
Kohl berg proposes a process-based "drawing out" of non-specific forms of virtue, the 
ultimate destination of this process has a very definite form and content: justice and 
equality. 
Kohl berg makes it a condition of his stage progression that movement is orderly 
and sequential. The individual moves up the six rungs ofthis ladder in definite order. He 
also follows Plato's maxim that "he who knows the good chooses the good." A person 
who is at stage three conventional morality will not commit a lower sequential moral 
action without feelings of guilt and anxiety. Individuals cannot skip a stage although 
they may be able to comprehend one stage ahead, resulting in the type of tension Socrates 
thought necessary for moral growth. 
The method by which individuals may see ahead is through the guidance of a 
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moral teacher and through the analysis of moral problems. This teacher acts more like a 
shepherd who uses techniques such as Socratic questioning to aid the person in reflecting 
upon his own views and in understanding views that may be more morally adequate. 
What Kohlberg is underscoring is that rather than giving external, content-specific ideals, 
the moral guide is providing a path for the learner to discover principles that are 
immanent within himself and all human beings. Thus Kohlberg proposes what is a 
universal, but subjective process that leads to a known objective principle - justice. 
Dewey conceives of consciousness as the highest development of an individual 
according to his theory of ethics. Conscience, as derived from obligation, is the ideal 
form of the practical good. It is the objective and universal principle of socialized 
morality. Kohlberg too espouses the universal ethic but locates it, in contrast to Dewey, 
in the principle of justice. The highest stage of Kohl berg's model, the sixth, is defined by 
this spirit. It represents Kohl berg's most significant work in the area of moral education 
and should be examined in light of Dewey's own conceptions of conscience and 
consciousness. 
Kohl berg defines his stage six formulation of morality in his book treatise The 
Philosophy of Moral Education. 
Right is defined by the decision of 
conscience in accord with self-chosen 
ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality and 
consistency. These principles are 
abstract and ethical (the golden rule, 
the categorical imperative); they are 
not concrete moral rules such as the 
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Ten Commandments. At heart, these 
are universal principles of justice, of 
the reciprocity and equality of human 
rights, and of respect for the dignity 
of human beings as individuals. (Kohlberg 1981, 19) 
Kohlberg is promoting the idea that there is indeed an objective and universal morality, 
that it is provoked by the conscience and confronted in the form of moral judgment (self-
chosen ethical principles"). This moral judgment is guided by the principle of justice and 
based on "sympathy for others" (Kohlberg 1981 , 141 ). These judgments are provoked by 
moral conflicts that occur between the individual and his society. "A moral conflict is a 
conflict between competing claims of people . . . where such conflicts arise, the principles 
we use to resolve them are principles of justice". (Kohlberg 1981 , 143) 
Kohlberg' s idea of morality, like Dewey' s, is a practical one. It involves concrete 
situations, ways to act in the present moment and in the human and social world. He 
asserts, 
In my view, mature principles are 
neither rules (means) nor values (ends) 
but are guides to perceiving and 
integrating all the morally relevant 
elements in concrete situations. They 
reduce all moral obligation to the 
interests and claims of concrete 
individuals in concrete situations; 
they tell us how to resolve claims 
that compete in a situation when it is 
one person' s life against another's. (Kohlberg 1981 , 175) 
Moral goodness, for Kohlberg, is firmly grounded in the human condition, in the reality 
of the moments and the interactions of our lives. These interactions or "competing 
claims" are most adequately resolved by Kohlberg' s stage six conception of justice and 
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its practical adjuncts: universalizability, consistency, and reversibility. The practical 
concern of this conception of justice is the dignity of human beings as individuals. "The 
content of moral concerns and claims is always welfare." (Kohlberg 1981 , 175) 
This regard for welfare is in the larger sense a regard for the equality of all. The 
belief in all as equals predisposes the moral agent toward a safeguarding of the welfare of 
all. This idea fits into Kohl berg' s conception of justice: "However, I have also argued 
that the stage six form implies justice as equity." (Kohlberg 1981, 176) Justice finds its 
meaning the recognition and defense of universal equal rights. Kohlberg states that at the 
highest stages of moral development the two are one and the same: At advanced stages, 
the most basic principle of justice is equality." (Kohl berg 1981, 144) 
Clearly Kohlberg is process-oriented in that he avoids content-specific approaches 
to moral development. He rejects the bag of virtues and other value-relativist models of 
moral behavior. Instead he proposes a framework approach which are general principles 
of conduct, and not specific rules of content. However, although the process of 
moralization is content-free (but is defined by patterns of thought Kohl berg calls moral 
stages) the end to which it strives has definite shape and character. This end, universal 
and objective though it may be, is of sure content: justice and equality. Thus while the 
means of his formulations are value free, Kohlberg's ends are not. Kohlberg argues, 
however, that although there exists value and content, this does not make the product 
Gustice) relativist because justice is a universal principle. The product content is 
universal and therefore valid in the terms set forth by Kohlberg. Kohlberg says as much 
in a passage from Is To Ought: "I simply point to the fact that no principle other than 
justice has been shown to meet the formal conception of a universal prescriptive 
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principle." (Kohl berg 1981, 176) 
In the sixth stage, the value of justice is realized through the previously mentioned 
criteria ofuniversalizability, consistency, and reversibility. The appropriateness of these 
principles is determined through empathic role playing. Roletaking, for Kohlberg, is the 
most important component of moral judgment. According to Kohl berg, moral concepts 
are concepts of social relationships. Within these social relationships are ideas of roles 
defined by shared expectations. 
The primary meaning of the word 
social is the distinctively human 
structuring of action and thought by 
role taking, by the tendency to react 
to others as like the self and to react 
to the selfs behavior from the other's 
point of view. (Kohlberg 1981, 141) 
Kohl berg continues that the importance of role-taking in moral judgment is rooted in the 
fact that moral judgment is based upon sympathy for others, as well as the idea that the 
moral person must refer to the ideal of the "impartial spectator" in order to judge 
objectively. 
Role playing is essential for Kohlberg because it has been shown to limit specific 
value systems and to stimulate general frameworks of moral thought. Kohl berg further 
posits that the true conditioning agent of moral activity is role playing: 
The precondition for a moral conflict 
is the human capacity for role-taking. 
Most social situations are not moral, 
because there is no conflict between 
the role-taking expectations of one 
person and another. Where such 
conflicts arise, the principles we use 
to resolve them are principles of justice. 
(Kohlberg 1981, 143) 
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Thus judgments based upon social experience give rise to role playing which sorts itself 
out by way of reference to principles of justice. Principled forms of role taking are 
defined by justice structures. The first of these structures is universalizability. 
Universalizability means that an action is just if it could in good conscience be 
applied to and practiced by all men. This precept negates the individuals capacity for 
self-interest by adopting the role of the representative being, the impartial spectator. 
Kant's categorical imperative is the practical end of this principle - "Act as you would 
want all human beings to act in a similar situation." (Kohl berg 1981 , 69) 
A related principle of justice found in the sixth stage is reversibility. Like 
universalizability, it takes the person beyond himself and his own interests by adopting a 
different point of view. Universalizability adopted the view of all men in a situation. 
Reversibility holds the viewpoint of the person affected by the original person' s decisions 
and actions. Kohlberg makes it a condition of justice reasoning that a moral judgment 
must be reversible, that the individual must be willing to live with his judgment if he 
were to trade places with the others in the situation being judged. As the categorical 
imperative was the practical tool of universalizability, so too the golden rule is the 
outcome of the principle ofreversibility: Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you. Kohlberg gives the example of a person who would not save a life: 
... That is he is not seeing the situation 
from the role of the person whose life 
is being saved as well as the person 
who can save the life (reversibility) or 
from the point of view of the possibility 
of anyone filling these roles (universalizability). 
(Kohlberg 1981 , 198) 
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The other construct ofKohlberg ' s stage six justice morality is the idea of 
consistency. The goal of rational moral judgments, for Kohlberg, is to arrive at moral 
decisions that all similarly-inclined people could agree on. Moral reasoning must be 
consistent across a broad spectrum of moral thinkers confronted with actual 
circumstances. The resolution of a moral conflict should be agreed upon by all thinkers 
who are at the level of a stage six justice response. 
Kohlberg's conception of high-order moral thinking, particularly in the sixth stage 
of his developmental model, find it's fulfillment in his formulation of justice. Justice, for 
Kohl berg, is based upon abstract and rational principles of equality such as the 
categorical imperative and the golden rule. Kohlberg breaks down these traditional 
frameworks of moral thought into their component parts. He labels these structures 
universalizability, reversibility, and consistency and brings them into the practical realm 
of social action through the vehicle of role-playing. The process of the actualization of 
these ideals lacks a specific structural content but they are recognizable through 
arrangements of moral thought Kohlberg calls stages; and their end product is of a 
definitive value-content - universal and objective modes of justice. 
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CHAPTER3 
AN ETHIC OF CARING 
Nel Noddings, in her book Caring, contends that traditional approaches to moral 
development, those based on reason and justice, are not the only and possible not even 
the best means to becoming more ethical. She believes these formal approaches deny the 
possibility of a receptive capacity necessary for moral growth. Noddings argues that the 
rational - cognitive method concerns justifications of abstract ideals that are removed 
from concrete situations and the elements of humaB emotion. Noddings contends that 
what is missing from their models is the fundamental aspect of caring. 
Noddings states that many people do not approach moral conflicts based upon 
formal principles but on the empathetic responses that she labels caring. This process of 
caring is based upon concretization rather than abstraction. The realization of this 
process is dependent upon a displacement of interest from the focus on the one doing the 
caring to the one cared for. 
Apprehending the others' reality, feeling 
what he feels as nearly as possible, is the 
essential part of caring from the view of 
the one caring. For ifl take on the other' s 
reality as possibility and begin to feel its 
reality, I feel , also, that I must act accordingly, 
that is, I am impelled to act as though in my 
own behalf, but in behalf of the other. 
(Noddings 1984, 16) 
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Noddings thinks that the caring response is always dependent on a move away from the 
self. She says that "At bottom, all caring involves engrossment." (Noddings 1984, 17) 
This engrossment for Noddings, however, is not universal. This is true because universal 
caring cannot be actualized, there is a lack of investment that leads to true empathy. This 
lack of investment results in the kind of abstraction that the caring ethic seeks to remedy. 
For Noddings, the immediate is the material of morality. 
Noddings claims this immediacy stands in stark contrast to the removed 
objectivity of the principles championed by moralists such as Kant, Dewey, and 
Kohlberg. Noddings believes caring to be reactive and responsive, caught up in the 
moment. Dewey and Kohlberg's formulations, while acted upon in the moment, are 
developed prior to that action, and thus have prior content. Caring, on the other hand, is a 
shifting response directed towards the needs of individuals, rather than a response driven 
by the demands of abstract and prior rules of conduct. Caring then, according to 
Noddings ' dictates, is pure process. It is not important how we care, but that we do care. 
This caring implies a will to action. Noddings affirms this: "To act as one -
caring, then, is to act with ' special regard' for the 'particular person' in 'concrete 
situations'." (emphasis mine) (Noddings 1984, 24). This idea of acting towards others in 
concrete situations reflects N oddings belief in the necessity of the socialization of the 
moral feeling. 
The ethical self is an active relation 
between my actual self and a vision 
of my ideal self as one - caring and 
cared-for. It is born of the fundamental 
recognition of relatedness; that which 
connects me naturally to the other, 
reconnects me through the other to 
myself. As I care for others and am 
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cared for by them, I become able to 
care for myself. (Noddings 1984, 49) 
It is this relatedness based on caring that results in the moral redemption of the one 
caring. It is also the impetus for the moral growth of the one cared for. The emotional 
benefits of being cared for leads the one cared for to model himself upon his beneficiary, 
the caring-for. This results in a habit of mutual modeling and attribution which becomes 
a cooperative form of moral development. (Noddings 1984, 123) Noddings asserts that 
the lack of this mutual modeling leads to in the ethical world, the kind of abstract and 
removed principles Dewey and Kohlberg champion, and in the social world, the kind of 
anti-social behavior that inhibits the healthy formation of relationships, and the positive 
development of the self. Noddings makes the claim that the type of moral principle that 
Dewey and Kohlberg esteem in fact promotes this anti-social behavior by removing the 
individual to a realm of abstract thought that exists apart from his social context. 
The methodology of this relatedness consists of a "broad and loosely defined ethic 
that molds itself in situation and has a proper regard for human affections, weaknesses 
and anxieties." (Noddings 1984, 25) It is not conditioned "by a host of narrow and 
rigidly defined- principles", and it "does not attempt to reduce the need for human 
judgment with a series of ' thou shahs' and 'thou shalt nots'." (N oddings 1984, 25) This 
negation of previously and externally constructed rules and principles does not negate the 
need for rational, objective thought. But this rational process should be utilized in the 
context of the ethic of caring. It should be used "to decide exactly what we will do in 
behalf of the cared-for." (Noddings 1984, 26) It is the end of the process of moral 
decision making, not the beginning. 
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The problem with the rational-objective mode for Noddings is not in its nature but 
in its use. It is applied prematurely to most moral situations. 
If rational-objective thinking is to be 
put in the service of caring, we must 
at the right moments tum it away from 
the abstract toward which it tends and 
back to the concrete. At times, we 
must suspend it in favor of subjective 
thinking and reflection, allowing time 
and space for seeing and feeling. The 
rational-objective mode must continually 
be re-established and redirected from a 
fresh base of commitment. (Noddings 1984, 26) 
Noddings is postulating a dialectical relationship between the objective and subjective 
frames of mind. The objective is intrinsically dominant, especially for men, and must be 
kept in check; it must be guided by the subjective. In Noddings' formulation, the rational 
mind serves the emotional mind for the betterment of both the acting and the acted upon. 
If this rational function is given free reign our thoughts become completely separated 
from the original object of our care. 
In her section entitled Ethics and Caring, Noddings sets forth her vision of ethics. 
I want to build an ethic on caring, 
and I shall claim that there is a form 
of caring natural and accessible to all 
human beings. Certain feelings, attitudes, 
and memories will be claimed as universal. 
But the ethic will not embody a set of 
universalizable moral judgments. (Noddings 1984, 28) 
N oddings, in this passage, affirms her view that the caring response is natural and 
universal. She claims that the impulse to act for another, indeed the quality of empathy, 
is innate. Empathy, for Noddings, is "Apprehending the others reality, feeling what he 
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feels as nearly as possible ... for if I take on the others reality as possibility, I feel , also, 
that I must act accordingly; that is I am impelled to act as though in my own behalf. .. " 
(Noddings 1984, 16) Noddings contends that it is this element of empathy, of an 
immediate caring response, that is absent in Dewey and Kohlberg ' s moral formulations. 
Noddings claims that Dewey and Kohlberg' s adherence to preconceived abstract 
principles precludes genuine empathic responses to social situations. Noddings points 
out that what Dewey and Kohlberg ' s moral philosophies leave out in their espousal of 
reason as the foundation of ethics is the importance of feeling. For her, instead of a 
universal moral principle, there is a universal moral sentiment. While its means and 
content, the ends to which it fulfills itself, differ, its presence is undeniable. Like 
Kohlberg, who believes the principle of justice to be both innate and perfectible, 
Noddings thinks the ethic of caring is attainable by all. " It lies latent in each of us, 
awaiting gradual development in a succession of caring relations." (Noddings 1984, 83) 
Noddings suggests that the care-response is a shared genetic property inherent in all 
humans. Noddings proposes that caring is a natural instinct. The fact that it is instinctual 
makes it also universal. The method of its fulfillment is also a universal property -
empathy or "engrossment" as Noddings labels it. But the means of caring - the "one-
caring", and then ends - "the cared-for", are both subjective elements. Thus, the 
objective moral truth of caring is fulfilled through the subjective instrument of the 
individual in-relation. 
This moral grounding within the subjective self is the opposite of the devotion to 
something beyond that is the hallmark of the traditional schools of philosophy and 
religion, whether it be God or principle. This moral grounding is predictated upon a 
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feeling: "Thus at the foundation of moral behavior - as we have already pointed out - is 
feeling or sentiment." (Noddings 1984, 92) This too is the opposite of Kant's 
traditionalist formula of the divorce of duty and desire, reason and emotion. Noddings 
poses the question, what is the nature of this universal sentiment? Her answer leads her 
to the origins of natural and ethical caring and the role of obligation in moral 
development. 
Noddings contends that morality as an "active virtue" is comprised of two 
complimentary elements. The first is the unconditioned, unreflective response known as 
natural caring. Noddings stakes out a position that no ethical action can follow an 
absence of this initial sentiment. The second feeling reacts to the memory of the first. 
Noddings states that this memory of caring and being cared for sweeps over us as a 
feeling of "I must" in response to the troubles of others. Therefore, natural and ethical 
caring grow out of one another and are in continual dialogue. 
But an ethic built on caring strives to 
maintain the caring attitude and is thus 
dependent upon, and not superior to, 
natural caring. The source of ethical 
behavior is, then, in twin sentiments -
one that feels directly for the other and 
one that feels for and with the best self, 
who may accept and sustain the initial 
feeling rather than reject it. (Noddings 1984, 80) 
This freedom to accept or not the initial feeling of natural caring gives rise to the question 
of ought or obligation. Noddings states that the initial feeling of natural caring is an 
involuntary genetic response universal to human nature. Because it is an automatic 
response, this form of caring does not fall within the purview of obligation which is based 
on voluntary actions. The second type of caring, ethical caring, is a voluntary ethic built 
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upon the memory of and an affinity for moments of natural caring which it hopes to 
maintain in active relationships with the social world. This will to maintain these 
relationships, and to foster new ones, based on an ethic of caring, is voluntary and thus 
falls within the bounds of obligatory action. 
It is within this second or ethical type of caring, and in its relationship to 
obligation, that Noddings forges her closest links to the ethical ideologies of Dewey and 
Kohlberg. Noddings establishes that her first form of caring, natural caring, which is 
based on a universal and automatic response, is the missing piece in the moral theories of 
Dewey and Kohlberg. Noddings' second form of caring, ethical caring, proceeds from 
self-chosen principles of caring that find their material in the memory of the first form, 
natural caring. This ethical form, caring, because it is based on self-chosen, voluntary 
principles is concerned with the same type of obligation or duty that permeates the moral 
works of Dewey and Kohl berg. The fundamental difference between the moral theories 
of Dewey and Kohlberg, and Noddings, however, is that while Dewey and Kohlberg's 
self-chosen ethical principles are based upon and directed by reason, Noddings' self-
chosen principles are based upon and directed by feeling. 
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CHAPTER4 
A MODEL COMPARISON 
This section will compare and contrast Dewey, Kohlberg, and Noddings ' theories 
as they have been presented in the preceding chapters. The philosophical differences 
between Noddings' work and that of Dewey and Kohlberg may be fairly obvious, but 
these differences will be explored in a more in depth manner in the following chapter. 
Several nuances of disagreement between the ideas of Dewey and Kohl berg have arisen 
and will also be examined. Throughout this chapter, the similarities of thought that exist 
among the three theorists will be highlighted and discussed. 
The writings of John Dewey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Nel Noddings are 
intimately concerned with the moral development of the individual. Each comes from a 
different school of thought and each supplies a distinct answer to the question of how to 
be moral. The ethical philosophies of Dewey and Kohl berg are closely related, 
particularly in their focus on man's rational nature, but there are fundamental divisions 
between the two men. Noddings takes an alternate approach to moral growth 
emphasizing the role of feeling and relationship, but her inquiry is a direct response to 
Dewey and Kohlberg' s formulations . Their systems culminate, in varying degrees, in an 
absolute imperative: For Dewey this is consciousness, for Kohl berg justice, and for 
Noddings an ethic of caring. This section will compare the similarities and examine the 
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differences of their thought to discern the methods by which they constructed their 
divergent theories. 
Both Kohlberg and Dewey believe that morality is inherently objective. Each 
finds fulfillment in a universally applicable principle of moral conduct. These principles 
are not content specific in terms of concrete situations but are delineated through general 
modes of thought such as the golden rule or categorical imperative. Dewey and Kohl berg 
hold that these abstract principles are intrinsic to all humans, and as such they are 
accessible to every person, thus their objective nature. Noddings, however, takes the 
contrary view asserting that there are no broad-based moral qualities, no universal and 
abstract principles of ethical truth to uncover. Dewey and Kohlberg deny any external 
source of objective goodness, which is the hallmark of traditional religious moral 
teachings. They equate goodness with the human condition. Noddings denies both 
external and internal objective goodness. For her, goodness is related to mutable 
reactions to immediate situations. Morality is concrete for Noddings in a way that it is 
not for Kohlberg and Dewey. The latter believe that their objective principles are not 
dependent upon the subjective realm of the individual. Noddings believes the subjective 
realm conditions the moral response of the individual. 
This is a significant division between the philosophies of Kohl berg and Dewey 
and Noddings. The other major difference, a related one, is the role of reason in morality. 
The objective moral principles at the heart of Dewey and Kohl berg's theories find 
fruition in subjective experience through reason. The individual is compelled to moral 
action through situational reflection. This compelling force is essential, in particular, to 
Kohlberg's theory of stage progression. Dewey and Kohlberg combine their ideals of 
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freedom with that of reason in what Kohlberg calls self-chosen ethical principles. Thus 
moral action is based on reason. Noddings rejects this idea. She believes goodness to be 
shaped and stimulated by feeling. Where Kohlberg and Dewey look to the objective 
principle, Noddings looks to the subjective relational experience. Where they look to 
thought, she looks to emotion. 
For both camps, however, the priming pumps of thought and emotion lead to the 
same results : action. All three are firm proponents of social activity as the proper and 
only setting for moral growth. While they disagree on the objective nature of morality, 
they do agree that it occurs in the human world. For all three, the moral development of 
the person is directly related to his role in society. 
Noddings, Dewey, and Kohlberg agree that society is both the proper setting and 
the material by which moral growth occurs. They also believe that action is a necessary 
condition of that growth. But whereas Dewey and Kohl berg assert that this action 
follows the commands of moral reasoning, Noddings thinks it develops from the 
wellsprings of feeling . They also agree that the human will is the means by which ethical 
reflection becomes ethical action. Unspoken here, of course, is their common 
presumption of the intrinsic freedom of human beings. But while they all attest to the 
importance of society and action in the ethical, they differ not only about what it is 
directed by (reason vs. feeling) but also what it is directed to: An abstract ideal for 
Dewey and Kohlberg, a concrete accomplishment for Noddings. For both Kohlberg and 
Dewey pre-existing principles shapes the reaction to a situation. For Noddings, the 
situation shapes its own reaction without reference to any prior principles. Noddings 
believes the only rule by which a situation is guided is an ethic of caring, and this ethic is 
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neither previously formed nor universally applicable in either content or spirit. This ethic 
depends only on the context of the situation. Noddings then is a proponent of moral 
relativism. 
Similar to Dewey and Kohlberg, Noddings holds that there is no ideological 
content to the means by which moral action fulfills itself such as is evidenced by the bag 
of virtues. But while Kohlberg, and to a much lesser extent Dewey, find identifiable 
content in the end to which that means is directed (i.e. , justice and consciousness) 
Noddings claims there are no definite characteristics not only of means but of ends in her 
philosophy of caring. Noddings establishes that every person and every situation is of a 
different moral nature and as a result there can be no prescribed content to the means by 
which a situation is morally reconcilable nor the end to which it is reconciled. Kohlberg, 
however, believes that while there is no content to the means of a morally reconcilable 
situation, there is a definite content to the reconciled end - the characteristics of justice. 
But is Noddings truly content free in both means and ends? 
Noddings, in rejecting prescriptions of virtue and by identifying each situation as 
unique, establishes that the means to an ethical end are situationally-based and thus 
content free . Emotions are immediate, unchanneled responses to an occurrence. They 
cannot be fashioned and directed as thoughts can be. For Noddings the emotions, 
particularly the caring emotion, is our truest nature and most reliable guide to doing what 
is right. For her rationality, because it deals in abstract conceptions, is not as rooted in 
the concrete and the human. Therefore it cannot meet the needs of concrete, human 
conflicts as well as the emotional response. 
This is perhaps the most significant schism between the Noddings and 
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Dewey/Kohl berg camps. This question of the affective vs. the reflective is the origin of 
their debate and colors the rest of their ethical views. However, the more immediate 
question as to the exact nature ofNoddings ' position on content remains. Her position on 
the relationship between content and means is a settled one. But her claim to a content-
free end merits attention. 
Noddings believes that the moral end, much as in the case of the means, is 
relativist because of the diverse nature of events. There can be no name given to an 
outcome of a moral act such as duty or justice because moral actions are based on 
feelings and situations which are in every case dissimilar. The characteristics of the end 
differ each time depending on the relationship of the caring-for and the cared-for. But 
though the characteristics of both the means and end differ, one detects in Noddings a 
uniting spirit at the end of moral conduct. The characteristics of her end ( caring) differ 
because of differing relationships, but the spirit of that end remains always the same -
kindness. Noddings, then, like Kohlberg and Dewey has content as the fulfillment of her 
ethical philosophy. She is relativist in situation but not in spirit. 
Dewey's philosophy finds as its moral end the ideal of goodness. This goodness 
is predicated upon the maturation of a process Dewey calls consciousness. But while 
Kohlberg establishes no specific virtue content to his ideal of justice, he does delineate 
types of behavior associated with a just outlook. Dewey does no such thing. He does 
propose a model of the progression of the conscience in three stages (which Kohlberg 
adopted and expanded upon) . This conscience is directed to the good. But Dewey, like 
Noddings, does not set forth types of thoughts and behavior that indicate what the good 
is. Dewey asserts that the moral person seeks the good and is directed to it by a 
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conscientious manner of relational living. But he does not concretely define this good. 
What Dewey and Kohlberg do have in common is that they both believe their 
moral end - goodness or justice - to be absolute. It is a form common to all men. 
Kohlberg and Dewey believe morality to be an objective truth located in a subjective 
being. Noddings believes morality to be a subjective truth located in the subjective 
being. But the fact that all have the capacity to care even if they do not, as all have the 
capacity to be good or just even if they are not, is a fact of potentiality that Noddings 
does not adequately address. 
Another major break in the thinking ofNoddings, Dewey, and Kohl berg is just 
how far the capacity to be kind, to be good or to be just extends. Dewey and Kohlberg, 
following the traditional rational model of Kant, believe this capacity to extend to all. 
There is a duty to be good or just not only to your family, your friends and your society, 
but to all men. Their moral philosophies propose a regard for all. Noddings believes this 
focus on the universal reach of conduct leads to an abstract understanding of relations 
that undermines true involvement in the lives of others. What this abstract conception of 
situations lacks is the empathy that results from concrete conflicts and results in caring 
intervention. This empathy extends only as far as a person's experience and so the proper 
sphere of moral conduct is the people who are most directly related to that person's life. 
Kohlberg and Dewey's regard for all becomes in Noddings' hands a regard for the related 
individual. This sense of regard harkens to a related issue at the heart of the ethical 
philosophies of the three: The idea of obligation. 
As we have seen, the form of obligation extends to everyone for Kohlberg and 
Dewey and to those directly related for Noddings. There is further disagreement on how 
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this obligation operates. For Kohlberg and Dewey, obligation, based on the rational 
faculties, applies to all equitably and is thus divorced from the individual's own desires. 
The individual's needs are only as important as any one else's and must be balanced with 
the needs of others. Noddings places obligation at the affective bequest of empathy and 
so for her, obligation is based on the desires of the individual. A person feels obligated 
because he feels. He has no need to consult an external principle to know what is right. 
He knows so naturally and internally. If he does not feel so naturally he has no obligation 
to act. Noddings is, ironically, following the same prescription here that Dewey upholds 
and Kohlberg cites for his own theory: The Socratic mantra "He who knows the good 
does the good." Only whereas, in Dewey and Kohlberg's models, the individual knows 
the good through reason, in Noddings' they know it through feeling. 
Empathy, the foundation ofNoddings' moral framework and the conditioning 
agent of her conception of obligation, is important to Kohl berg as well. For both, 
empathy is the taking of a role by the individual in a conflict. But whereas for Noddings 
this conflict is always concrete, for Kohlberg it may be immediate or it may be a 
conjuring exercise of the mind. This conjuring occurs when the person contemplates the 
ethics of the abstract such as in the case of the categorical imperative. It is immediate for 
Noddings because it is based on the immediacy of a caring feeling that puts one person 
into the place of another before the rational faculty can intervene. For Kohlberg, role 
taking is a measured process dictated by reason. For Noddings, it is an instantaneous 
emotional response that occurs prior to reason. 
Empathy does not enter into Dewey's formulations to the extent that it shapes 
Kohlberg" and Noddings'. For him it is the working of universal reason in the absence of 
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feeling. For her, it is individual feeling in the absence ofreason. Reason may be 
employed to further the ends of an initial emotional response, but works only within that 
framework according to Noddings. For Kohlberg, to be human is to feel but these 
feelings are subservient to the role of reflection. Kohl berg, like Kant, divorces feeling 
from reason to find moral truth. Dewey believes it is feeling which prompts that journey 
toward truth. He thinks that unless an end arouses an emotional response the individual 
will not be drawn toward it. In this he agrees with Noddings. But unlike Noddings he 
believes that this initial response, while valuable in initiating the ethical process, is not as 
constructive as reason in bringing the process to fruition. 
The closest association between the works ofNoddings and Kohlberg occurs in 
this area of empathy and roletaking. Noddings ' theory precludes many of the abstract 
aspects of Kohl berg's model of role-taking, but in engaging with the decision making of 
concrete situations their beliefs are quite similar. A hallmark of Kohlberg's formulation 
of role-taking in the sixth stage is the idea of reversibility. Kohlberg appropriated this 
concept from the work of Rawls. Reversibility states that moral judgments must be 
reversible; that we must live with our own judgment of another if we were to trade places 
with him. 
This process places the person firmly in the arena of empathy. For Rawls and 
Kohl berg, a moral act is good if it is adopted under the guidance of the original position -
chosen in ignorance of who will be affected by an action. This position ensures fairness 
by eradicating self interest. It also places the individual in the shoes of the other people 
in the situation. This idea of reversibility brings morality down form the lofty heights of 
the categorical imperative and places it in the realm of those directly involved in a moral 
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conflict. In the ideal ofreversibility, Kohlberg meets Noddings on neutral ground. They 
both believe here in applying moral behavior to the immediate situation and to the people 
related to that situation. They also believe in reversibility, the ability to see both 
positions in a moral situation. Noddings calls this ability empathy. But what for 
Noddings conditions a moral response to the immediate situation - the affective - is not 
what prompts moral action for Kohlberg - the reflective. 
What separates Kohlberg from Dewey and Noddings is that Kohlberg empirically 
tested his theories. Dewey, like Kohlberg, emphasized a scientific approach to the moral 
but only Kohlberg followed through on testing his views. Kohlberg did so through a 
series of surveys he conducted upon different cultures and age groups throughout the 
world. His tests lend a measure of credence to his claims of moral stage growth. While 
Dewey approached his theory of ethics with a rigorous and scientific mindset he did not 
take the final step toward proving it by the scientific method. Noddings also does not 
take this step toward confirmation of her theory. It is this empirical examination of his 




The moral theories of John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg are a continuation of 
the intellectual pursuits of the English and French philosophes of the Enlightenment. 
These men stressed the empirical study of nature and the rational foundations of man. 
The following century saw thinkers such as Hegel and Kant apply this scientific ideology 
to the study of social relations. The concern of these 19th Century rationalists, the nature 
of morality, and their approach to this question of ethics, the faculty of reason, has 
significantly influenced Dewey and Kohlberg's visions of the ethical world. Dewey and 
Kohlberg, like their European predecessors, believe that reason is innate in human nature. 
Being universal, reason is then the best tool for solving moral problems, according to 
Dewey and Kohlberg. 
Moral problems, for both Dewey and Kohlberg, are dilemmas of relation among 
men. Ethical questions concern man in his present society and are solved for the 
betterment of that society. Dewey and Kohlberg agree on this point. For them, the moral 
man is the man who actively works to improve both himself and his society. To do so, 
men must consult prior and abstract principles of morality knowable by their ability to 
reason. Dewey calls this moral principle Goodness, and it is arrived at through a moral 
awakening he calls consciousness, which in turn has its roots in the individual 
conscience. This awakening progresses through three stages of moral development. 
Dewey' s conception of stage growth is taken up by Kohlberg who posits the universal 
moral principle to be a goodness based on justice. 
Noddings asserts that Dewey and Kohlberg's moral theories, resting as they do on 
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reason, are devoid of the emotional factors that color a person's ethicaljudgments. 
Noddings believes that what is missing from Dewey and Kohlberg ' s principles are the 
ideas of empathy, feeling, and caring. Like Dewey and Kohlberg, who suggest the 
existence of a universal faculty, Noddings too holds that there is an innate feature to all of 
us. But in contrast to their proposed universal, reason, Noddings offers the care response 
as this instinctual element. From this fact of natural caring, Noddings develops her moral 
principle of ethical caring. Ethical caring, Noddings asserts, is based on the memories of 
moments of natural caring. These memories of natural caring urge the individual 
onward, to actively seek out and foster caring relationships in his or her social world. 
Taken together, the moral theories of Dewey and Kohlberg, which center upon man's 
unique ability to reason, and that ofNoddings, which focuses on man's unique 
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